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Abstract
We consider a duopoly in a homogenous goods market where part
of the consumers are ex ante uninformed about prices. Information
can come through two different channels: advertising and sequential
consumer search. The model is similar to that of Robert and Stahl
(1993) with two major (and some minor) modifications: (i) a (small)
percentage of consumers is fully informed and (ii) less informed con-
sumers do not have to pay a search cost for buying at a firm from
which they have received an ad. We derive the symmetric Nash equi-
libria and show that price dispersion is an essential ingredient of any
equilibrium. Despite the similarities in the models, our results differ
substantially from those obtained by Robert and Stahl (1993). First,
advertising and search are ”substitutes” for a large range of param-
eters. Second, there is no monotone relationship between prices and
the degree of advertising. In particular, it is possible that high prices
are advertised, while low prices are not. Third, when the cost of ei-
ther one of the information channels (search or advertising) vanishes,
the competitive outcome arises. Finally, both expected advertised and
non-advertised prices are non-monotonic in search cost. One of the
implications is that firms actually may benefit from consumers having
low (rather than high) search costs.
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1 Introduction
Consumers and firms do not find each other costlessly in the marketplace.
Consumers spend time, money and effort searching to find firms that offer
the price and quality that best suits their tastes. Firms, on the other hand,
spend money on trying to attract (new) consumers. It is true that the use
of the internet has facilitated this process of reaching out for agents on the
other side of the market. However, internet penetration (and certainly the
use of search engines) is still quite low in many markets. Moreover, in those
active electronic markets where the internet may have made it much cheaper
for some consumers to search for the best offer, it is still the case that firms
have to pay considerable sums of money for advertising.
There is a considerable amount of economic literature on both advertising
(see, e.g., the seminal papers by Butters (1977)) and search (see, e.g., semi-
nal papers by Diamond (1971), Burdett and Judd (1983) and Stahl (1989)).
The separate study of firms’ incentives to advertise or consumers’ incen-
tives to search and the implications of these incentives for the behavior of
markets has yielded interesting insights. One important finding that can
be consistently found throughout this large literature is that price disper-
sion may be consistent with equilibrium behavior. Still, if consumers for
example do not have adequate incentives to bring about competitive behav-
ior on the part of individual firms, one may ask the question whether in
these cases of ”insufficient” search, firms may have incentives to advertise
their products. Conversely, if the literature finds that firms do not advertise
their products enough, one may wonder whether consumers have incentives
to search more. This interaction between firms’ incentives to advertise and
consumers’ incentives to search is the core of this paper.
To the best of our knowledge there exist only two papers where the inter-
action between advertising and search activities is studied before. In their
seminal paper Robert and Stahl (1993) study the equilibrium properties of
a homogeneous goods model where in the first stage firms choose an adver-
tising intensity and a price they charge for their product; after (not) having
observed firms’ advertisements, consumers decide in the second stage on
whether or not to search for (more) prices in a sequential way, i.e., they first
choose whether or not to obtain one price quotation and after having seen
the result of this price search they decide whether to continue searching or
not. All consumers are identical and have to pay a search cost c per search.
The advertising technology is convex, i.e., it requires more and more money
to reach one more consumer. Despite the fact that they cannot get a closed-
form solution for the equilibrium strategies, Robert and Stahl reach a few
important results. First, the equilibrium always exhibits price dispersion.
Second, lower prices are more heavily advertised than higher prices. Third,
there exists a complementarity between search and advertising in the sense
that for those parameter values for which firms do not advertise, consumers
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do not search either (autarky). Moreover, whenever firms do advertise, con-
sumers also are engaged in search activities. Fourth, there is an important
asymmetry between advertising cost approaching zero and search cost ap-
proaching zero: in the first case market behavior converges to competitive
pricing, whereas in the second case it does not. Stahl (2000) builds on the
model by Robert and Stahl (1993) and analyzes some specific cases, the
most important modification being that he has a different interpretation of
the search cost parameter.
Our paper can be considered a two-firm version of the Robert and Stahl pa-
per with two important modifications. First, we allow for the fact that
consumers are heterogeneous in the sense that different consumers have
different search costs: some consumers have a given positive search cost,
whereas others have zero search cost either because they enjoy shopping or
have a negligibly small opportunity cost of time or because they use search
engines. This assumption often made in the search literature reflects the
fact that search engines are used in some market segments where internet
purchases have some impact on overall market behavior. Second, we inter-
pret the search cost parameter as the cost of searching a firm, while Robert
and Stahl interpret the search cost as the cost of visiting a firm. In their
model therefore consumers also have to pay search costs when buying from
a firm they got an advertisement from, while in our model visiting an ad-
vertising firm is costless. In general, search costs consist of two components:
the cost of visiting a shop knowing that the shop carries the product the
consumer wants to buy and the cost of finding a shop that carries the prod-
uct. An ad eliminates the importance of the second component of search
costs. From this perspective, Robert and Stahl (1993) consider one extreme
situation, namely one where the second component of search costs is ab-
sent. In this case the role of advertising is to inform consumers on the price
and if this price is low enough compared to the expected price in other
(non-advertising) shops the consumer buys from the advertising shop. How-
ever, this consumer then still has to pay visiting costs. We consider the
other extreme situation, namely the one where the costs of visiting a shop
are negligibly small compared to the costs of finding a shop that sells the
product. The role of advertising here is twofold: an ad informs consumers
that the shop sells the product and tells against which price. This makes
consumers save on search costs. In fact, in this situation a firm in a sense
pays the search costs for the consumer to gain a competitive advantage on
non-advertising firms that have to be searched for by the consumer. Apart
from these two modifications, we also consider a linear advertising technol-
ogy where the cost of reaching an additional consumer is independent of the
fraction of consumers already reached.1 This allows us to get closed-form
1There are some other stylistic modifications in presentation which turn out to be
unimportant for explaining the considerable differences in results. We allow firms to
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solutions which make the analysis easier to understand.
Despite the fact that these assumptions seem to embody only minor modi-
fications vis-a-vis the model of Robert and Stahl (1993), we show that our
results differ considerably from theirs. First, in our model there is a con-
siderable degree of substitutability between advertising and search: in case
consumers increase their search activities for example as a reaction to lower
search costs, firms tend to decrease their advertising expenditures as long
as advertising is not too expensive. On the other hand, when firms econ-
omize on advertising, consumers tend to search more as long as the search
costs are not too high. Second, there is no consistent relationship between
advertised and non-advertised prices. In particular, unlike the results ob-
tained in Robert and Stahl (1993) it is not always the case that lower prices
will be advertised more and higher prices will be advertised less. Third,
expected prices are non-monotonic in changes in the search cost parameter,
but when search costs approach zero, our equilibrium prices converge to the
competitive price level.
We will now briefly explain the main ideas behind our results and indicate
why our results differ from those obtained by Robert and Stahl (1993). First,
in our model advertising and search are ’substitutes’. This is partly caused
by the existence of consumers that search for free, called shoppers. The
existence of shoppers drives the prices down and in this way can make it
attractive to search, even when the firms do not advertise. In Robert and
Stahl’s model, assuming shoppers do not exist, advertising is necessary to
lower prices. Therefore, in their model in an equilibrium where consumers
search, firms need to advertise. Furthermore, the interpretation of the search
cost parameter in Robert and Stahl’s model leads to the conclusion that an
equilibrium where firms advertise without search is not possible. The main
idea behind this result is that if consumers have to pay search costs when
visiting an advertising firm, these firms need to lower their prices by at least
as much as the search costs, leading non-advertising firms to lower their price
too, in this way facilitating search. When the search costs are interpreted
as the cost of searching a firm, like in our model, advertising firms can ask
high prices, making search unprofitable.
In our model, advertised prices may be higher than non-advertised prices.
There are two different cases where this can happen; when the advertising
probability is low and when there is little consumer search. In the first case
both advertising and non-advertising firms face the same competition on
the shopper segment. However, an advertising firm knows almost for sure
he will face no competition over the non-shoppers that receive its ad, while
randomize between not advertising and advertising with costs A. When firms do advertise
they are assumed to reach all consumers. In equilibrium, firms may not advertise, advertise
for sure, or advertise with a certain positive probability α. It turns out that this can be
reinterpreted as firms advertising with reach α, and costs αA. See also footnote 5 for more
details.
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a non-advertising firm has monopoly power only on a part of the searching
non-shopper segment. Since an advertising firm has monopoly power over
a larger fraction of consumers considering buying from it, it has a larger
incentive to raise its price. In the second case, when consumer search is low,
non-advertising firms sell virtually nothing to the non-shoppers. A non-
advertising firm therefore has to compete for the shoppers, leading to severe
price competition and low prices. Both arguments do not hold in Robert
and Stahl’s model, since they don’t allow for shoppers.
Another reason why in our model advertised prices can be higher than non-
advertised prices is the difference in interpretation of the search costs. In our
model, receiving an ad means that a consumer does not have to pay search
costs, and so advertised prices can be fairly high. In Robert and Stahl’s
model a consumer receiving an ad still has to pay search costs to visit the firm
and so advertised prices should be lower than in our model. In fact, in our
model the effect of advertising is two-fold: advertising attracts consumers
that otherwise would have searched a competitor’s shop and advertising
’pays’ the search costs for these consumers.
To understand the reason why expected prices are non-monotonic with re-
spect to changes in search cost, it is important to understand the reason
why there is price dispersion in this model. Price dispersion arises from the
fact that in equilibrium there are different types of consumers: those that
are informed of all prices (or at least more than one firm’s price) and those
that have only observed one price (either through advertisement or through
search). Over the last group of consumers, firms have monopoly power, but
there is competition for the first group of consumers. Price dispersion is the
way firms balance these two forces. When search cost decline, it is natu-
ral for consumers to search more ceteris paribus. This forces firms to lower
their prices. On the other hand, when consumers search more, and with
lower prices, firms have an incentive to lower their advertising intensity and
thereby to increase prices (as ceteris paribus there are fewer consumers who
make price comparisons). In some cases, the first tendency is larger than
the second; in other cases, the second tendency is larger.2 When search
costs are very small, firms don’t advertise at all. This means that firms can-
not decrease their advertising intensity further and the model behaves as a
search model with a fraction of fully informed consumers. Prices converge to
marginal cost in these models, when search costs become arbitrarily small.
Another interesting aspect is the following. There is now some literature on
the relation between consumer search costs and firm profits. For instance,
Bakos (1997) argues that in homogenous goods markets firms have incentives
to increase if possible search and switching costs to deter search. The idea
2Expected (non-advertised) prices are non-monotonic in advertising costs as well. The
reason here is again that there are two effects, namely a decrease in advertising and an
increase in advertised price, that work against each other. This analysis is not that simple
however and depends on the type of equilibrium that exist. More on this in Section 4.
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here is, of course, that firms can charge higher prices and make more profits
when consumers do not search a lot. This is also the starting point of Kuksov
(2004). He, however, shows that with decreasing search costs firms also
have incentives to differentiate, thereby lowering price competition. This
can finally lead to higher profits when search costs decrease. In our model a
same type of reasoning holds, although instead of allowing firms to change
the product design, we allow firms to decrease their advertising activities,
possibly leading to less competition and higher prices when search costs
decrease.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents
the model and Section 3 gives a full characterization of the equilibrium
configurations possible. The most important comparative static results are
presented in Section 4 and Section 5 concludes. The more lengthy proofs
can be found in the Appendix.
2 Model
Our model deals with a homogeneous good market with two active firms.3
The production costs of the good are constant and equal across firms. We
will normalize the production costs to 0. There are no capacity constraints.
Firms have the possibility to advertise. The per consumer advertising costs
are A. The linearity of advertising cost allows us to solve the model analyt-
ically. Advertising is an ’all-or-nothing’ decision, that is, a firm either does
not advertise or it advertises to the complete market. In an ad the firm in-
forms the consumers that it exists and sells the product and it mentions the
price it charges. It is assumed firms have to stick to the price they announce
in their ad, that is, ads never lie, and that they have to set a single price to
all consumers.
At the demand side of the market there is a unit mass of consumers. Each
consumer demands a single unit of the good and has valuation θ > 0 for the
good. We will assume that θ > A, otherwise it is clear firms will not adver-
tise. A fraction γ, with 0 < γ < 0.5, of the consumers is called shoppers.
These consumers are assumed to know the prices charged by both firms and
they will buy at the firm with the lowest price (provided this price is lower
than θ). The other 1− γ consumers a priori do not know the prices charged
by the two firms. Sometimes they will get an ad from one or both firms, de-
pending on the advertising strategy of the firms. Consumers can also decide
to search one or both firms for prices. It is assumed that search is costly:
3An important part of the analysis of Robert and Stahl (1993) deals with the N firms
case as one question they are interested in is whether market outcomes get closer to the
competitive outcomes when N increases. As the model cannot be explicitly solved for
N > 2, we will not deal with this issue.
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each search action costs c, where c < θ. Note that when c > θ, consumers
will not search. Consumers have perfect memory; they know which firms
they already searched and also remember which price they found there. Fur-
thermore it is assumed that consumers receive all advertisements that are
sent by the firms before they start to search. This implies that only non-
advertising firms will possibly be searched and that firms that have been
searched will not be searched for a second time. It is assumed that search
is sequential: after each search action the consumer decides whether or not
to continue searching.
The timing of the game is as follows. First the firms simultaneously decide on
their advertising and pricing strategies. With probability αj a firm j adver-
tises and chooses a price from price distribution F j1 (p), where F
j
1 (p) denotes
the probability that a price smaller than or equal to p is chosen.4 With
probability 1− αj a firm does not advertise and chooses a price from price
distribution F j0 (p). So a firm j’s strategy is given by {αj , F j0 (p), F j1 (p)}.5
After the firms have decided on their strategy, advertisements are realized
according to αj and prices are drawn from F j0 (p) or F
j
1 (p). We will denote
by pj0 and p
j
1 the upper bounds of the supports
6 of price distributions F j0 (p)
and F j1 (p) respectively. In the same way, p
j
0
and pj
1
denote the respective
lower bounds. The shoppers now buy at the lowest-priced firm (provided
the price is lower than θ). The non-shoppers first see the advertisements
and then decide on their search strategy. If they decide not to search, they
buy at the firm with the lowest advertised price lower than θ (or, if there
are no ads, they do not buy at all). If they decide to search they pick
a non-advertising firm at random and obtain a price quotation from that
firm. This price quotation is added to the set of already obtained price
quotations, consisting of all advertised prices and the prices that have been
4We will see later that the unique symmetric equilibrium requires mixed strategies.
Pure strategies are however also included in this specification: a firm that plays pure
(price) strategy pˆ has F j1 (p) = 0 for p < pˆ and F
j
1 (p) = 1 for p ≥ pˆ.
5It may seem that this way of modelling a firm’s strategy is different from the one in
Robert and Stahl (1993), where a firm’s strategy is denoted by (in our notation) {p, αj(p)}
implying a firm can condition its advertising decision on the price it charges and not vice
versa. It can be shown, however, that there is no fundamental difference between these two
ways of modelling in the sense that any equilibrium of our model can be translated into an
equilibrium of the modified model and vice versa. In our model, the advertising strategy
can be conditioned on the price using Bayes theorem as α(p) = αf1(p)
αf1(p)+(1−α)f0(p) and the
two price distributions naturally can be combined as F (p) = αF1(p) + (1 − α)F0(p). In
Robert and Stahl’s way of modelling, the probability of advertising is α =
∫
α(p)dF (p),
the price distribution conditional on not advertising is F0(p) =
∫ p
0 1−α(x)dF (x)∫
1−α(p)dF (p) and the
price distribution conditional on advertising is F1(p) =
∫ p
0 α(x)dF (x)∫
α(p)dF (p)
. Some of these results
are also derived in Robert and Stahl’s paper. More details on this conversion are available
upon request.
6The support of a price distribution F (p) are all prices p where ∂F (p)
∂p
6= 0.
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searched for. Based on this set, the consumer decides whether to search
further or to stop searching. If he decides to stop searching, the product is
bought from the firm with the lowest price lower than θ in the set of already
obtained price quotations.
All players (firms and consumers) are rational and they all seek to maximize
their profit or utility. The rationality of the players and the structure of the
game is common knowledge. We will look for a symmetric perfect Bayesian
equilibrium. In the remainder we will therefore drop the index j. The
profit pi0(p) denotes the expected profit when a firm does not advertise and
charges price p and pi1(p) denotes the expected profit when advertising and
charging price p. We define pi0 = pi0(p) for all p in the support of F0(p) and
pi1 = pi1(p) for all p in the support of F1(p), so pi0 is the expected profit from
not advertising and pi1 is the expected profit from advertising. Whenever
α > 0, pi0 = pi1.
3 Equilibria
We will first focus on the search behavior of the consumers. In the second
part of this section firm behavior will be specified. Some observations on firm
behavior will however be useful in the derivation of the consumer behavior.
Lemma 3.1 Firms will never set a price equal to 0 or above θ.
The proof is available on request. The main idea incorporated in the proof
is that profits are equal to 0 if a firm sets a price equal to 0 or above θ.
Setting a positive price below θ and not advertising yields strictly positive
profits.
Since the price will never be above θ, consumers will always buy when they
have obtained one or more price quotations and have stopped searching.
3.1 Consumer behavior
For the non-shoppers we derive the optimal behavior conditional on a set of
price quotations the consumer has already observed. Note that this set can
be empty when no ads have been received and no firms have been searched.
Assume for the moment that the set is non-empty. If the lowest price in
the set is below a certain reservation price r0 the consumer will not search
further and buy at this lowest priced firm. If the lowest price in this set is
however above r0 and there are one or more firms still to be searched, the
consumer will choose a firm from which it did not obtain a price quotation
at random and will add the price found to the set of already obtained prices.
If there are no more firms to be searched the consumer will buy at the lowest
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priced firm.7,8
To specify the reservation price r0 assume the lowest price in the set is given
by pˆ. The expected gain from searching once more is given by∫ pˆ
p
0
(pˆ− p)dF0(p). (1)
This expression shows that the expected gain arises when the price found is
below pˆ. Note that F0(p) is used: only non-advertising firms are searched.
The above expression can be integrated in parts and simplifies to∫ pˆ
p
0
F0(p)dp.
This defines r0 as
∫ r0
p
0
F0(p)dp = c. One can easily see that for prices below
r0 it is not profitable to search: the expected gain is lower than the search
costs. For prices above r0 the expected gain exceeds the search costs and so
searching is profitable. It follows that when search costs are low, the reser-
vation price is low as well implying that consumers easily continue searching
if prices are not low.
We assumed that the set with already obtained price quotations was non-
empty. If this set is empty, consumers will search for sure if r0 < θ. If r0 = θ
they will search with probability µ ≤ 1, and if r0 > θ they will not search at
all. To see this, note that the expected gain from searching when no price
has yet been obtained is given by expression (1) where pˆ is replaced by θ.
This implies that searching will be profitable if and only if θ > r0. Hence,
µ = 1 when r0 < θ, 0 ≤ µ ≤ 1 when r0 = θ and µ = 0 when r0 > θ.
3.2 Firm behavior
We will now derive some general results on firm behavior that will be helpful
when deriving the equilibria of our model.
Lemma 3.2 In a symmetric equilibrium, α < 1.
The main idea behind this lemma can be explained as follows. If both firms
advertise for sure, all consumers will be aware of all prices in the market.
7Implicit in this specification is the assumption of a symmetric equilibrium. Symmetry
implies that all non-advertising firms a priori are the same for the consumers. Therefore
r0 is not dependent on the firms that still have to be searched and consumers will pick a
firm at random if they want to search.
8For completeness we assume that if the lowest price in the set equals r0 consumers
will not search on. We will see later however that the probability that the lowest price
equals r0 is 0.
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Price will therefore be driven down to 0 (Bertrand outcome). The firms
obtain negative payoffs −A and so have an incentive not to advertise.
A corollary of lemmas 3.1 and 3.2 is that the expected profits of a non-
advertising firm charging p
0
are strictly positive. It has positive probability
that the competitor also does not advertise and so does not charge a price
lower than p
0
. This means that the non-advertising firm will with nonzero
probability 1− α attract at least half of the shoppers and so expects profit
to be at least equal to p
0
(1− α)12γ > 0.
A second observation is that like many search papers, but unlike the paper
by Robert and Stahl (1993), the price distributions are atomless. Also,
prices that are chosen will never be larger than the reservation price of non-
shoppers. These results are a consequence of the assumptions that there
exists a mass of fully informed consumers and that consumers have to pay
a search cost only when they have not yet observed a firm’s price.
Lemma 3.3 F0(p) and F1(p) are atomless and F0(r0) = F1(r0) = 1.
Hence, if consumers get one or more ads, they will not search further. If
they do not receive an ad, they will search at most once. The last result
says that between the lower and upper bounds of the supports of the price
distributions the profits are constant.
Lemma 3.4 For all prices between and including p
0
and p0, pi0(p) is con-
stant and equal to pi0. For all prices between and including p1 and p1, pi1(p)
is constant and equal to pi1.
As we assumed that both search cost c and advertising cost A are smaller
than θ all equilibria have either search or advertising or both.
3.3 Characterization of Equilibria
The model has four exogenous parameters: θ, c, A and γ. It is possible to
scale θ, c and A, that is, a model with these parameters multiplied by a con-
stant gives the same equilibria, except that all prices (and r0) and profits are
multiplied by the same constant. For convenience, we will in the remainder
of the paper scale all parameters with respect to θ, and so we use c and A
relative to θ, and set θ = 1.
We first provide a classification of the different types of equilibria that may
arise in our model and then characterize the equilibrium strategies of firms
and consumers in each of these cases. The following theorem shows that
three types of equilibria may arise in our model.
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Theorem 3.5 Each symmetric equilibrium can be classified in one of three
different types. Type I has firms not advertising at all (α = 0). Type
II has firms advertising with strictly positive probability (0 < α < 1) and
overlapping supports of the price distributions with p0 = p1. Type III has
firms advertising with strictly positive probability (0 < α < 1) and price
distributions that do not overlap. In particular, p0 = p1 and so advertised
prices are higher than non-advertised prices.
Note that in type III equilibria, advertised prices are always higher than
non-advertised prices. The reverse, advertised prices always being below
non-advertised prices, cannot arise in equilibrium. In the Appendix we
show that if advertised prices are always lower than non-advertised prices,
an advertising firm has an incentive to deviate and advertise the highest non-
advertised price. This leads to somewhat less sales, but at a much higher
price.
Each of the three types of equilibria has a corresponding parameter region
where the equilibrium exists. These regions will be expressed in terms of A
and c, taking γ constant. The derivation of the equilibria and corresponding
parameter regions will show that each parameter set [A, c, γ] has a unique
corresponding symmetric equilibrium.
Each symmetric equilibrium of a certain type can be further classified in
one of two cases. Case a has 0 < µ < 1 and case b has µ equal to 1 (for
type I and II) or 0 (for type III). To see that in equilibrium type I an
equilibrium with µ = 0 does not exist, note that a type I equilibrium has
α = 0. No search would imply firms only sell to shoppers, and so prices would
be 0. This contradicts the no-search assumption. In equilibrium type II an
equilibrium with µ = 0 also does not exist. If there were such an equilibrium,
a non-advertising firm charging p0 would obtain zero profit, contradicting
the discussion immediately after lemma 3.2. In equilibrium type III an
equilibrium with µ = 1 does not exist. If there were such an equilibrium,
the requirement pi1(r0) = pi1(p1) would give rise to the condition r0(1−α)(1−
γ)−A = p
1
(α+(1−α)(1−γ))−A. On the other hand, it is easy to see that
in such a situation pi0(r0) = 12r0(1−α)(1− γ), which given this condition is
larger than p
1
(γα + 12(1 − α)(1 − γ)) = pi0(p1). Hence, the non-advertising
firm would have an incentive to deviate and charge the reservation price.
Therefore, we conclude that each of the three types of equilibria classified
in the theorem, can be further divided into two subcategories, depending on
whether µ = 0, 0 < µ < 1, or µ = 1.
For each of the three types of equilibrium, we will now derive case a. The
derivation of case b is very similar in nature and can be found in the Ap-
pendix.
Equilibrium type I: no advertising (α = 0).9
9Note that in this special case when α = 0 our model coincides with the one analyzed
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As indicated above when characterizing optimal search behavior, 0 < µ < 1
implies r0 = 1.10 Furthermore, in this case of no advertising, a firm’s profit
equals
pi0(p) = p[(1− γ)12µ+ γ(1− F0(p))].
This expression consists of two parts. The non-shoppers search at random
and do not search further; this gives each firm a fraction 12 of the non-
shoppers. The shoppers buy at the lowest-priced firm; they are attracted
if and only if the competing firm charges a higher price, which happens
with probability 1−F0(p). A maximum price below r0 can not be part of an
equilibrium since deviating to a price of r0 would then be profitable. So, p0 =
r0. Charging the maximum price gives expected profit pi0(r0) = r0 12µ(1−γ).
Equating pi0(p) and pi0(r0) gives the equilibrium price distribution:
F0(p) = 1−
(r0 − p)12µ(1− γ)
γp
,
which has as its lower bound p
0
= r0µ(1−γ)2γ+µ(1−γ) . Note that this price distribu-
tion is strictly increasing for p ∈ [p
0
, r0] and so does not have a ’gap’. It is
clear that deviating to lower prices is not profitable.
Since r0 = 1,
∫ r0
p
0
F0(p)dp = c is an expression in γ, c and µ. This expression
provides an implicit definition of µ:
µ ln
µ(1− γ)
2γ + µ(1− γ) = (c− 1)
2γ
1− γ . (2)
Note that µ ln µ(1−γ)2γ+µ(1−γ) is strictly decreasing in µ from 0 to ln
1−γ
1+γ for
0 ≤ µ ≤ 1 so that µ is uniquely defined for all c, γ.
For α = 0 to hold, advertising should not be profitable. The expected profit
from advertising a price p is given by p[(1−γ)+γ(1−F0(p))]−A = (1−γ)(p+
1
2µr0− 12pµ)−A. This expected profit is maximized for p = r0, giving profit
r0(1−γ)−A. Advertising is not profitable when r0(1−γ)−A < r0(1−γ)12µ.
Rearranging terms and using r0 = 1 gives
µ > 2(1− A
1− γ ).
The two assumptions 0 < µ < 1 and α = 0 together hold when
max{0, 2(1− A
1− γ )} < µ < 1.
in Janssen, Moraga-Gonzalez and Wildenbeest (2004).
10To simplify the derivation of equilibrium Ib in the Appendix, we will not yet plug
r0 = 1 in the equilibrium expressions for equilibrium Ia. The same holds for equilibrium
IIa.
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Using the definition of µ given by (2) and the fact that µ ln µ(1−γ)2γ+µ(1−γ) is
strictly decreasing for 0 < µ < 1, gives rise to the following parameter
restrictions:
β1 ≡ 1 + 1− γ2γ ln
1− γ
1 + γ
< c < min{1, 1 + 1− γ −A
γ
ln
1− γ −A
1−A }. (3)
As 0 < β1 < 1, it is clear that this type of equilibrium exists whenever
1−γ
2 < A.
The above discussion, and the derivation of equilibrium Ib in the Appendix
can be summarized as follows.
Proposition 3.6 An equilibrium with α = 0 has
F0(p) = 1−
(r0 − p)12µ(1− γ)
γp
.
If β1 < c < min{1, 1+ 1−γ−Aγ ln 1−γ−A1−A } (where β1 is defined in (3)), r0 = 1
and µ is implicitly defined by
µ ln
µ(1− γ)
2γ + µ(1− γ) = (c− 1)
2γ
1− γ .
If c < min{β1, 2Aβ11−γ }, µ = 1 and r0 = cβ1 .
Equilibrium type II: some advertising (0 < α < 1) and partially overlapping
price distributions (p0 = p1).
First note that since 0 < µ < 1 the reservation price for non-shoppers should
be equal to the consumers’ valuation in this case, i.e., r0 = 1. Furthermore,
the profit equations in the case of non-advertising and advertising are equal
to
pi0(p) = p[γα(1− F1(p)) + γ(1− α)(1− F0(p)) + (1− γ)(1− α)12µ],
respectively,
pi1(p) = p[α(1− F1(p)) + γ(1− α)(1− F0(p)) + (1− γ)(1− α)]−A.
These equations have a similar interpretation as above. A firm only attracts
all shoppers if it has the lowest price taking into account that the competitor
may charge different prices depending on whether or not it advertises. In
case the firm does not advertise, it attracts only half of the non-shoppers
that do search themselves and only when the competitor does not advertise.
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The advertising firm attracts more consumers, namely all non-shoppers if
the competitor does not advertise or if the competitor advertises a higher
price, and has to pay the advertising cost A.
Whenever the upper bounds of the two price distributions are equal we can
use standard arguments to show that the upper bound then has to be equal
to the reservation price, i.e., p0 = p1 = r0. As this upper bound is in
both price distributions, pi0(r0) has to be equal to pi1(r0), which gives the
condition
r0(1− γ)(1− α)(1− 12µ) = A. (4)
Using lemma 3.4 note that pi0(p) = pi0 and pi1(p) = pi1 for all prices higher
than max{p
0
, p
1
}. In this price region we therefore can use pi0(p) = pi1(p) to
derive
F1(p) = 1−
A− (1− 12µ)p(1− α)(1− γ)
α(1− γ)p = 1−
(r0 − p)(1− α)(1− 12µ)
αp
.
(5)
Using pi0(p) = pi0(r0) and the above expression for F1(p) we can also derive
that
F0(p) = 1−
r0(1− γ)(1− α)12µ− Aγ1−γ + p(1− α)(γ − 12µ)
γ(1− α)p = 1−
(r0 − p)(12µ− γ)
γp
.
(6)
We stress that these price distributions only hold for prices that are equal
to or larger than max{p
0
, p
1
}. Note that the price distributions do not have
a ’gap’, that is, they are strictly increasing for p ∈ [max{p
0
, p
1
}, r0], so
the supports of F0(p) and F1(p) overlap in this price region. We can now
distinguish two cases: (i), p
0
< p
1
and (ii), p
0
> p
1
.
We first look at case (i). In this case, F1(p) is as defined above, and F0(p) is
as defined above for p > p
1
= A
(1−γ)(1− 1
2
µ(1−α)) , where this expression can be
obtained by setting F1(p) = 0 in (5). For p < p1, we can use pi0(p) = pi0(r0)
to get the price distribution
F0(p) = 1−
(r0 − p)(1− γ)(1− α)12µ− pγα
pγ(1− α) , (7)
with p
0
= r0
1
2
µA
1
2
µA+r0(1− 12µ)γ
.
Case (ii) can be derived in the same way as case (i). We then get that
F1(p) = 1− r0(1− γ)(1− α)− p(1− α)
αp
(8)
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for p < p
0
and p
1
= r0(1− γ)(1− α).
To check under which conditions an equilibrium of type IIa exists, we first
note that it is not profitable to charge a price below p
0
without advertising
and that it also is not profitable to advertise a price below p
1
. In addition,
the following parameter restrictions have to hold. First, µ should be between
0 and 1. Furthermore, α as defined by (4) should also be between 0 and 1.
This gives rise to condition µ < 2− 2A1−γ . Finally, it should be that µ > 2γ,
since otherwise F0(p) is decreasing in p. Thus, we have that µ should satisfy
2γ < µ < min{1, 2− 2A/(1− γ)}.
For equilibrium IIai,
∫ r0
p
0
F0(p)dp = c and r0 = 1 gives
1 +
1− γ
2γ
µ ln
1
2µA
1
2µA+ (1− 12µ)γ
− (1− 1
2
µ) ln
A(1− 12µ)
(1− γ)(1− 12µ)−A12µ
= c,
(9)
which implicitly defines µ as a function of A, c and γ. For equilibrium IIaii,∫ r0
p
0
F0(p)dp = c and r0 = 1 gives
1− γ −
1
2µ
γ
ln
µ− 2γ
µ
= c, (10)
again implicitly defining µ as function of c and γ. The L.H.S. of expressions
(9) and (10) are both decreasing in µ and so 2γ < µ < min{1, 2−2A/(1−γ)}
can be rewritten as
max{1 + 1− γ
2γ
ln
A
A+ γ
− 1
2
ln
A
1− γ −A, 1 +
1− γ −A
γ
ln
1− γ −A
1−A }
< c < 1 + (1− γ) ln (1− γ)
2 −Aγ
A(1− γ) + (1− γ)2
(11)
for case (i), and
max{β2, 1 + (1− γ)
2 −A
γ(1− γ) ln
(1− γ)2 −A
1− γ −A } < c < 1 (12)
for case (ii), where β2 ≡ 1 + 1−2γ2γ ln(1 − 2γ). For equilibrium type IIa to
hold either restriction (11) or restriction (12) should hold. However, note
that for restriction (11) to be relevant, p
0
should be smaller than p
1
, while
for restriction (12), p
0
should be larger than p
1
. In the Appendix we show
that the resulting conditions can be simplified to the ones mentioned in
Proposition 3.7.
Proposition 3.7 An equilibrium with 0 < α < 1 and p0 = p1 has α =
1− A
r0(1−γ)(1− 12µ)
and F0(p) and F1(p) being defined by (6) and (5) respectively
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in the common support [max{p
0
, p
1
}, r0] and (7) and (8) respectively for
p < p
1
and p < p
0
.
(i) If either
A <
1− 2γ
2
and β2 < c < 1 + (1− γ) ln (1− γ)
2 −Aγ
A(1− γ) + (1− γ)2
or, A > 1−2γ2 and
max{1+ 1− γ
2γ
ln
A
A+ γ
− 1
2
ln
A
1− γ −A, 1+
1− γ −A
γ
ln
1− γ −A
1−A } < c <
1+(1−γ) ln (1− γ)
2 −Aγ
A(1− γ) + (1− γ)2 ,
0 < µ < 1 in which case r0 = 1 and µ is defined by equations (9) for the
case where p
0
< p
1
and by (10) for the case where p
1
< p
0
.
(ii) If A < 1−2γ2 and
2Aβ1
1−γ < c < β2 or A >
1−2γ
2 and
2Aβ1
1− γ < c < 1 +
1− γ
2γ
ln
A
A+ γ
− 1
2
ln
A
1− γ −A,
µ = 1 and r0 is implicitly defined by
r0
2
ln(
r0
A
(1− γ)− 1)− r0(1− γ)
2γ
ln(
r0
A
γ + 1) + r0 = c
for the case where p
0
< p
1
and by r0 = cβ2 for the case where p0 > p1.
Equilibrium type III : some advertising (0 < α < 1) and price distributions
that do not overlap (p0 = p1) .
Finally, we will turn to the last type of equilibrium, namely the one where
firms spend some money on advertising and when they do advertise, they
set consistently higher prices than when they don’t advertise, i.e., p0 = p1.
Using standard arguments, we first observe that p1 = r0 = 1. Profits in case
of advertising are now given by the following expression
pi1(p) = pα(1− F1(p)) + p(1− α)(1− γ)−A.
This expression can be understood as follows. When a firm advertises, it
knows it gets all consumers when its competitor also advertises and sets
a higher price. When the competitor does not advertise, he always asks
a lower price and so shoppers will buy from him. Non-shoppers however
do not search after receiving an ad and buy from the advertising firm. In
order to derive the equilibrium price distribution in case of advertising, we
equate this expression with the profits the firm gets when advertising the
reservation price: pi1(1) = (1 − α)(1 − γ) − A. This yields the following
expression
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F1(p) = 1− (1− p)(1− α)(1− γ)
pα
, (13)
with p
1
= (1−α)(1−γ)α+(1−α)(1−γ) . Now note that the profits a firm gets from not
advertising are given by
pi0(p) = pγα+ pγ(1− α)(1− F0(p)) + p(1− γ)(1− α)12µ.
A non-advertising firm in this case gets shoppers if, and only if, the other
firm advertises or the other firm does not advertise and sets a higher price.
Non-shoppers will come to the shop only when the competitor also does not
advertise and in that case, both firms receive half of the non-shoppers. It is
easy to see that setting the highest non-advertised price yields a profit equal
to pi0(p0) = p0γα+ p0(1− γ)(1− α)12µ. Equating pi0(p) and pi0(p0) gives
F0(p) = 1−
(p0 − p)(γα+ (1− γ)(1− α)12µ)
pγ(1− α) . (14)
It is easy to see that charging a price below p
0
is never profitable. Advertising
a price below p
1
is also never profitable.11 It also should not be profitable to
refrain from advertising and charge a price above p0. Note that for p ≥ p0,
pi0(p) = p(γα(1 − F1(p)) + (1 − α)(1 − γ)12µ). Substituting the expression
for F1(p) given in (13) yields an expression that is decreasing in p whenever
µ < 2γ. Hence, this is a necessary condition for this equilibrium to exist.
For the above equilibrium to hold, there are some other parameter restric-
tions as well. First, 0 < α < 1 requires pi0 = pi1, which gives
α2
1
2
µ(1− γ)+α((1− γ)(1−µ)+ γ
1− γA)+A− (1− γ)(1−
1
2
µ) = 0. (15)
Furthermore, 0 < µ < 1 gives
∫ 1
p
0
F0(p)dp = c. Substituting F0(p) gives
1 +
(1− α)(1− γ)−A
γ(1− α) ln
γα+ (1− α)(1− γ)12µ
γ + (1− α)(1− γ)12µ
= c. (16)
Equations (15) and (16) together define α and µ as functions of c, A and γ.
For the equilibrium to hold, 0 < α < 1 and 0 < µ < 2γ.
Note that equation (15) is an increasing function of α, that reaches A− (1−
γ)(1− 12µ) for α = 0 and A1−γ for α = 1. The restriction 0 < α < 1 therefore
reduces to A− (1− γ)(1− 12µ) < 0, which gives µ < 2− 2A1−γ .
It can be shown that expression (16) is decreasing in µ and so the restrictions
0 < µ < min{2γ, 2− 2A1−γ } can be written as
11To see this, write down pi1(p) for p ≤ p
1
using the above expression for F0(p) and note
that pi1(p) is increasing in p.
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max{1 + (1− γ) ln (1− γ)
2 −Aγ
(1− γ)2 +A(1− γ) , 1 +
(1− γ)−A
γ
ln
(1− γ)−A
1−A } < c <
1 + ((1− γ)−A) ln (1− γ)
2 −A(1− γ)
(1− γ)2 +Aγ .
We summarize as follows:
Proposition 3.8 Equilibria with 0 < α < 1 and p0 = p1 have F1(p) as
defined in (13) and F0(p) as defined in (14) with p0 =
(1−α)(1−γ)
α+(1−α)(1−γ) . If
max{1+(1−γ) ln (1− γ)
2 −Aγ
(1− γ)2 +A(1− γ) , 1+
(1− γ)−A
γ
ln
(1− γ)−A
1−A } < c <
1+((1−γ)−A) ln (1− γ)
2 −A(1− γ)
(1− γ)2 +Aγ ,
we have 0 < µ < 1 and α and µ are implicitly defined by (15) and (16). If
c > 1 + ((1− γ)−A) ln (1− γ)
2 − (1− γ)A
(1− γ)2 + γA ,
µ = 0 and α is given by (1−γ)
2−A(1−γ)
(1−γ)2+Aγ .
In table 4 in the Appendix the expressions for the different equilibria are
summarized.
3.4 Discussion
We will now first take a closer look at the parameter regions in which the
different types of equilibria exist. Figures 1 and 2 depict for each equilibrium
the region where it exists in terms of A and c. We note that the regions do
not overlap and that they together fill the complete parameter space. Figure
1 is drawn for γ = 0.1, while figure 2 assumes γ = 0.4. Equilibria IIa and
IIb are both divided by a dotted line. Left of this line, p
1
< p
0
, while right
of this line p
0
< p
1
.
We note that for the equilibria with no advertising (equilibrium type I) to
exist, the search costs c should be low or the advertising costs A should be
high. The intuition is fairly simple: for high A advertising is too expensive
to be profitable. For low search cost, firms can not ask high prices since
otherwise the consumers will search on and so advertising is too expensive
relative to the prices that can be asked.
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Figure 1: The parameter regions in terms of A and c where the different
equilibria exist, assuming γ = 0.1. Each region is numbered according to
the type of equilibrium that exists in that region.
Figure 2: The parameter regions in term of A and c where the different
equilibria exist, assuming γ = 0.4. Each region is numbered according to
the type of the equilibrium that exists in that region.
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The equilibria with full consumer search (equilibrium types Ib and IIb where
µ = 1) are in a region with low search costs, whereas their counterparts Ia
and IIa with partial consumer search (0 < µ < 1) are in a region with
higher search cost. The equilibrium with no consumer search (equilibrium
type IIIb) only exists when c is relatively high and A is not too low or too
high. It is clear that higher search cost lead to less search. The intuition for
the restriction on A is as follows. For high A it is not profitable to advertise
and so firms only sell to the shoppers and searching consumers. Note that if
consumers do not search at all, prices and profits will be driven to 0, giving
consumers an incentive to search. For low A firms have a large incentive
to advertise, which drives prices down. This leads to a higher payoff from
search and therefore to some consumer search even if the search costs are
large.
We note that if firms do not advertise (α = 0), the non-shoppers search with
strictly positive probability as long as the search cost c are below the val-
uation for the product (see also Janssen, Moraga and Wildenbeest (2004)).
On the other hand, if the non-shoppers do not search (µ = 0), the firms
advertise with strictly positive probability as long as the advertising costs
are below 1−γ. This is in contrast with the Robert and Stahl model, where
no advertising implies no consumer search and a strictly positive probability
of advertising leads to a strictly positive probability that consumers search.
These differences are driven by the assumption of a non-zero segment of
shoppers and the assumption that consumers only have to pay search costs
when searching a shop and not when visiting an advertising firm. First, if
there are no shoppers, no advertising and a positive probability of consumer
search gives firms monopoly power over the searching consumers, leading
to prices equal to θ, contradicting the assumption of consumer search. If
on the other hand there are shoppers, the firms have an incentive to com-
pete, leading to lower prices and thus facilitating consumer search. Second,
if consumers have to pay search costs for every first visit to a shop, firms
do advertise with strictly positive probability and consumers do not search,
firms will never ask a price above 1 − c,12 contradicting the assumption of
no search. If consumers on the other hand only have to pay the search costs
when searching a shop, firms will never ask a price above 1, which is not
contradicting the no-search assumption.
We will now discuss the equilibrium price distributions that arise. Note
that when the search costs c are low or high or the advertising costs A
are high, p
0
< p
1
. For intermediate c, and low A, p
0
> p
1
. This can be
12Advertising a higher price leads to no sales and a negative profit, asking a higher price
without advertising leads to no sales and a zero profit. However, the profit of asking a
price below 1− c is strictly positive.
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explained by the tradeoff firms have to make. Advertising firms attract the
non-shoppers for sure if the competitor does not advertise, but they always
have to compete for the shoppers and have to compete for the non-shoppers
if the competitor advertises. Non-advertising firms have to compete for the
shoppers, but attract half of the searching non-shoppers if the competitor
also does not advertise. When c is low or A is high, α is low. This means
that an advertising firm with large probability attracts the non-shoppers
and only has to compete for the shoppers. A non-advertising firm also
has to compete for the shoppers, but attracts only half of the searching
non-shoppers. Therefore, a non-advertising firm has a greater incentive
to compete and to lower its price. On the other hand, when c is high, the
probability with which non-shoppers search, µ, is low and so non-advertising
firms mainly sell to the shoppers, for which they have to compete. This leads
to fierce competition, and low prices conditional on not advertising. These
observations on the equilibrium price distributions differ from the Robert
and Stahl (1993) result as explained in the Introduction.
4 Comparative Statics
In this section we will give some asymptotic and comparative static results.
We are interested in the impact of changes in the three parameters c, A and γ
of the model on the variables that are of main interest such as prices, profits
and welfare. We also provide a discussion on the impact on the intensity
with which consumers search or the intensity with which firms advertise as
these variables are important in understanding the results. We start the
discussion with some limiting results.
Theorem 4.1 a When c becomes arbitrarily small, firms do not advertise
and there is full consumer search (µ = 1). The maximum price charged
approaches 0.
b When A becomes arbitrarily small, the advertising intensity α converges
to 1 and the expected advertised price Ep1 converges to 0.
c When γ becomes arbitrarily small, the advertising intensity α converges
to 1 − A and µ becomes arbitrarily close to 0. Furthermore, F1(p) →
1− A(1−p)p(1−A) .
These results can be understood as follows. When the search costs ap-
proach 0, the Bertrand result arises. This asymptotic result also occurs in
the pure search models of Stahl (1989) and Janssen, Moraga-Gonzalez and
Wildenbeest (2004). The intuition is simple: if the search costs are very low,
consumers are almost always willing to search and to prevent further search,
firms lower their prices, in that way preventing advertising. This Bertrand
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result however does not arise in Robert and Stahl’s model. In their model,
when the search costs approach zero, advertising diminishes, but the mini-
mum price is strictly above zero. This difference in results is caused by the
fact that there is a shopper segment in our model and not in Robert and
Stahl (1993). Without shoppers, Robert and Stahl obtain a Diamond type
of result, namely that when c vanishes, the equilibrium price distribution
converges to a degenerate distribution where all firms charge one particular,
strictly positive, price for sure. Given that all firms charge the same price,
no consumer wants to continue searching even at arbitrarily small search
costs. A fraction of shoppers, however small, causes a breakdown of this
result.
When the cost of advertising A approaches 0, we reach the same asymptotic
results as in Stahl’s pure advertising model (1994) and Robert and Stahl’s
advertising and search model: all firms advertise almost for sure, and prices
become small. The intuition is simple. When advertising is virtually cost-
less, every firm is willing to advertise, leading to fierce competition and
decreasing prices.
When the shopper segment vanishes, the results are clearly different from
the results of Stahl’s pure search model with vanishing shopper segment,
where the Diamond (monopoly pricing) result arises. The difference be-
tween our model and the pure search models is formed by the possibility to
advertise. Our result replicates the result in Stahl’s pure advertising model,
which assumes no shopper segment. Robert and Stahl yield again a different
conclusion mainly due to differences in the advertising cost function.13
We next proceed to a full comparative statics analysis. The analysis provides
an assessment of the impact of a change in exogenous parameter values on
the economic variables of interest α, µ, the expected non-advertised price
Ep0, the expected advertised price Ep1, the profit pi and welfare conditional
on a certain type of equilibrium to be present in the economy. Note that in
the equilibria with partial consumer search (0 < µ < 1), 1 − Ep0 − c = 0.
Furthermore, in equilibria I and II the profit equals r0 12µ(1−α)(1−γ), while
in equilibrium III profit equals r0(1 − α)(1 − γ) − A. We define expected
welfare as the value of all transactions taking place minus the search and
advertising costs that have been incurred, i.e, expected welfare equals
1− (1− γ)(1− µ)(1− α)2 − 2αA− (1− γ)µ(1− α)2c.
13Note that with linear advertising costs the absence of shoppers implies that the price
distribution conditional on not advertising is degenerate in the reservation price. With
γ = 0 and linear advertising costs therefore there is no consumer search. In the Robert
and Stahl model with γ = 0 there is consumer search because the convex advertising cost
function prevents a firm advertising a low price from advertising to the complete market.
Consumers that do not receive an ad therefore have a positive probability of finding a low
price and have an incentive to search.
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Ia Ib IIa IIb IIIa IIIb
α 0 0 + + + 0
µ - 0 - 0 - 0
Ep0 - + - +/- - 0
Ep1 -∗ + - 0
pi - + - 0 - 0
Welfare - - - - -∗ 0
Table 1: Local comparative statics results with respect to changes in c. A ∗
denotes that numerical methods have been used to obtain the result.
In figures 3 and 4 we give a description of how for example, expected price
depends on search cost across equilibria for specific values of the other exoge-
nous parameters. Tables 1 to 3 provide an overview of the local comparative
statics. A ′+′ in these tables denotes a positive impact, a ′−′ denotes a neg-
ative impact, ′0′ denotes no impact and ′+ /−′ denotes that the impact can
be positive as well as negative, dependent on the specific parameter values.
In some cases we have been unable to analytically evaluate the sign of the
derivative. In these cases we resort to a numerical analysis and evaluate the
impact by taking γ fixed to 0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15, and so on. These cases are
marked by a ∗. We derive some of the results in the tables in the Appendix.
We will first discuss the comparative statics results with respect to changes
in search costs. The local comparative statics are given in table 1.
Note that whenever 0 < µ < 1 non-shoppers search less whenever search
costs increase. This seems an intuitive result. In general, the table shows
that advertising increases in c. In the equilibria with full consumer search
(µ = 1), the reserve price increases, making it more profitable to advertise.
In equilibria with 0 < µ < 1, less consumer search implies that not ad-
vertising is less attractive (since a non-advertising firm only attracts those
non-shoppers that are searching) and so firms advertise more. In the equi-
libria where non-shoppers are indifferent between searching and not search-
ing (0 < µ < 1), or equivalently where c is relatively high, there is only
a single effect of an increase in c on expected prices. The expected non-
advertised price Ep0 is decreasing in c, since in equilibrium Ep0 = 1 − c.
Expected advertised prices also decrease because the increase in advertising
leads to more competition. For low c, and full consumer search (µ = 1),
the expected advertised and non-advertised prices may both increase and
decrease. Higher search costs in this equilibrium imply non-shoppers have
a higher reservation price. This fact can be exploited by firms to charge
higher prices. However, more advertising puts advertised prices under pres-
sure, and since non-advertising firms compete with advertising firms on the
shopper segment their prices also tend to decrease.
22
(a) Plots of α as a function of c.
(b) Plots of µ as a function of c.
(c) Plots of Ep0 as a function of c.
Figure 3: Plots of several variables as a function of c. The left figures are
drawn for γ = 0.2 and A = 0.2, the right figures are drawn for γ = 0.2 and
A = 0.6.
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(d) Plots of Ep1 as a function of c.
(e) Plots of pi as a function of c.
(f) Plots of welfare as a function of c.
Figure 3: Plots of several variables as a function of c (continued). The left
figures are drawn for γ = 0.2 and A = 0.2, the right figures are drawn for
γ = 0.2 and A = 0.6.
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An overview of these results is given in figure 3,14 where we depict α, µ,
Ep0, Ep1, pi and welfare as a function of c, taking γ and A fixed. The figures
on the left are drawn for γ = 0.2 and A = 0.2, while the figures on the right
are drawn for γ = 0.2 and A = 0.6. When A = 0.2, letting c increase from 0
to 1 means that equilibria Ib, IIbi, IIbii, IIaii, IIai, IIIa and IIIb hold in
this order. For A = 0.6, the figure covers the equilibria Ib, Ia, IIai, IIIa and
IIIb in this order. The figure clearly shows how the monotonicity of both α
and µ with respect to changes in c may give rise to non-monotonic behav-
ior of both the expected advertised and non-advertised price with respect
to c. This non-monotonicity follows from the conflicting forces at work: a
higher c implies a higher reservation price creating a tendency for prices to
increase, whereas a higher c also implies more advertising and so a higher
frequency of price comparing consumers leading to more competition and
lower prices. Especially the non-monotonicity of the non-advertised price is
striking: when c increases, it may rise from 0 to 0.8 and then fall back again
to 0.2− 0.4. The figure also shows that expected advertised prices are often
above expected non-advertised prices.
The figure also shows that when search costs increase, profits first increase,
but later decrease. Given the behavior of prices and advertising this is quite
intuitive. When c is low, prices increase, and so profits increase. However,
when c increases further, advertising starts to increase and even though
prices increase, the increasing competition resulting from advertising tends
to lower profits. The net effect is that profits stay constant. When the
search costs are quite high, prices decrease and competition increases, lead-
ing to decreasing profits. The figure shows that firms do not unambiguously
have an incentive to raise consumer search costs, contradicting claims in the
literature (see, e.g., Bakos (1997)) that firms would like search costs to be
high to avoid competition.
Welfare decreases in figure 3. There are several effects on welfare. First,
with an increase in search costs searching consumers have to pay more and
we have seen that more is spent on advertising. These costs work in the
direction of a decrease in welfare. Furthermore, there is less consumer search,
which means that the non-shoppers who do not receive an ad more often do
not buy, which is bad from a welfare point of view as well. On the other
hand, more advertising leads on average to more informed non-shoppers,
who therefore buy without having to pay search costs. This has a positive
effect on welfare. It turns out however that the negative effect on welfare is
larger than the positive effect.
Lastly, we note that the primary effect of a change in search costs is twofold.
In equilibria with full consumer search, the reservation price increases in the
14Note that there are no discontinuities in the graphs and that the scale of the vertical
axis can differ per picture. (In the pictures it may look like Ep1 is discontinuous in c.
However, when c is small, there is no advertising and so Ep1 is undefined.)
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Ia Ib IIa IIb IIIa IIIb
α 0 0 -∗ - -∗ -
µ 0 0 0/- 0 +/- 0
Ep0 0 0 0 +/0 0 +/-
Ep1 +∗ + +∗ +
pi 0 0 +/- + +/- +/-
Welfare 0 0 +/- +/- +/- -
Table 2: Local comparative statics results with respect to changes in A. A
∗ denotes that numerical methods have been used to obtain the result.
search costs, while in equilibria with partial consumer search (0 < µ < 1)
the primary effect of a change in search costs is in reducing the amount of
search. When the search costs are very high, so that equilibrium IIIb holds,
none of α, µ, Ep0, Ep1, pi and welfare depends on c. This is because in an
equilibrium with such high search costs there is no search at all (µ = 0) and
the reservation price exceeds the valuation of the product. Therefore in this
case a change in search costs has no effect at all.
We now look at the effects of a change in advertising costs A. The impact
of a change in advertising costs on the economy is through a change in ad-
vertising intensity. If the economy is in an equilibrium without advertising,
then a change in advertising costs does not affect the economy at all. If
there is advertising, we see the intuitive result that advertising is decreasing
in the advertising costs. As a result of less competition in the advertised
segment, advertised prices increase in the advertising costs. In case we stay
within a region where there is either no search (µ = 0) or full search (µ = 1),
there is no impact on search intensity. In the other regions (IIa and IIIa)
the impact on search intensity is less clear. In equilibrium IIa search inten-
sity is defined by the requirement that consumers are indifferent between
searching and not searching at all. From equation (6) we see that the price
distribution of non-advertised prices over the common support is unaffected
by a change in α. If this is the distribution that fully captures the behavior
of non-advertised prices (case ii), then the benefits of search are not affected
either and therefore the search intensity remains unaffected. If the distri-
bution that describes the behavior of non-advertised prices is also captured
by equation (7) (case i), then it follows that the expected non-advertised
price increases in A due to the fact that the price distribution as defined in
equation (7) is increasing in α. This implies a reduced incentive to search
and a lower search intensity. Similar factors explain the ambiguous impact
on search behavior in case of equilibrium IIIa. In this case search intensity
and advertising intensity are jointly determined by equations (15) and (16):
non-shoppers should be indifferent between searching and not searching and
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(a) Plots of α as a function of A.
(b) Plots of µ as a function of A.
(c) Plots of Ep0 as a function of A.
Figure 4: Plots of several variables as a function of A. The left figures are
drawn for γ = 0.2 and c = 0.1, the right figures are drawn for γ = 0.2 and
c = 0.7.
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(d) Plots of Ep1 as a function of A.
(e) Plots of pi as a function of A.
(f) Plots of welfare as a function of A.
Figure 4: Plots of several variables as a function of A (continued). The left
figures are drawn for γ = 0.2 and c = 0.1, the right figures are drawn for
γ = 0.2 and c = 0.7.
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firms should be indifferent between advertising and not advertising.
The fact that non-advertised prices can both increase, decrease and stay
constant in A can be explained as follows. In equilibria IIa and IIIa the
expected non-advertised prices cannot change since in these equilibria con-
sumers should be indifferent between search and no search. In equilibria
IIb and IIIb the expected non-advertised prices however can change. How
this change works out precisely is easiest to see in case of equilibrium IIIb.
In this equilibrium µ = 0 so non-advertising firms only sell to shoppers.
Furthermore, advertised prices are always higher than non-advertised prices
so if a non-advertising firm competes with an advertising firm, the non-
advertising firm attracts all the shoppers. The effect of an increase in A
and the corresponding decrease in advertising is twofold. The minimum
advertised price rises, making it possible for non-advertised prices to rise
since there is no gap between F0(p) and F1(p). On the other hand a lower
probability that the competitor advertises lowers the probability of hav-
ing monopoly power on the shopper segment, thus lowering the expected
non-advertised price. The net effect can be both positive and negative. In
equilibrium type IIb, these two effects play a role, but there is an additional
effect since a non-advertising firm in this equilibrium also attracts searching
non-shoppers who do not receive an ad. When the probability of advertising
decreases the probability of attracting these consumers increases and since
a firm has monopoly power on them the non-advertised price can increase.
An overview of these results is depicted in figure 4, where α, µ, Ep0, Ep1, pi
and welfare are represented as a function of A, taking γ and c fixed. In
the left graphs, we take γ = 0.2 and c = 0.1, while in the right graphs
γ = 0.2 and c = 0.7. When c = 0.1, letting A increase from 0 to 1 means
that equilibria IIbii, IIbi and Ib hold in this order. For c = 0.7 equilibria
IIaii, IIai, IIIa, IIIb, IIIa and Ia hold in this order. Note that for c = 0.1
we plot Ep1 only for A < 0.21. For higher values of A Ep1 is not defined.
The figures show that although Ep0 is non-monotonic in A, the expected
non-advertised price has only little variation. This is in contrast with the
expected advertised price, which monotonically increases from 0 to 0.5 - 1.
Profits and welfare can both both increase and decrease in the advertising
costs. The effect on profits can be explained by the fact that an increase in
advertising costs implies on one hand less competition and therefore higher
advertised prices, but on the other hand also leads to more expenditure on
advertising if firms decide to advertise. The ambiguous effect on welfare is
already apparent from the advertising term in the expression for welfare, as
advertising decreases while the costs increase and the net effect can be both
positive and negative.
We finally look at the effect of an increase in the fraction of shoppers γ.
When the number of shoppers increases, it is clear that the advertising in-
tensity decreases as ads are less effective: advertisements only affect the non-
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Ia Ib IIa IIb IIIa IIIb
α 0 0 -∗ - -∗ -
µ + 0 +/- 0 +/- 0
Ep0 0 - 0 +/- 0 +/-
Ep1 +∗ +/- +∗ +/-
pi + - +/- 0 +/- +/-
Welfare + + +/- +/- +/- +/-
Table 3: Local comparative statics results with respect to changes in γ. A
∗ denotes that numerical methods have been used to obtain the result.
shoppers, who get informed through ads, and the fraction of non-shoppers
decreases. Expected prices can both increase and decrease in γ. More shop-
pers leads to more competition and lower prices, but less advertising leads to
less competition and higher prices. These two effects can lead to both a net
increase and to a net decrease in prices. The resulting profits for firms can
also both increase and decrease in γ and the same holds for welfare. Here,
when there are more shoppers, less consumers have to pay search costs or
do not buy at all, which has a positive effect on welfare. But the resulting
decrease in advertising implies that less non-shoppers are informed, which is
bad from a welfare point of view. The resulting welfare change can be both
positive and negative. Again, it is not the case that firms should necessarily
lose out when consumers use more and more search engines as the direct
pro-competitive effect could be entirely offset by a decrease in advertising
expenditures and a resulting incentive to increase advertised prices.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have analyzed the interaction between two information
transferring technologies: advertising and search. In particular we have
focused on the interaction between the incentives for firms to advertise and
for consumers to search in relation to the parameters underlying the search
and advertising technology. We take the view that an important role of
advertising is not just to inform consumers of the price of the product,
but especially of the fact that the firm (shop) carries the product under
consideration so that after receiving an ad from the shop a consumer is no
longer uncertain whether the shop carries the product at all. An implication
of this view is that the search cost of consumers visiting a shop from which
they have received an ad is much lower than the search cost of visiting a
shop from which no advertisement is received. In the paper we analyze the
extreme case where this search cost after receiving an ad is negligibly small.
Apart from this interpretation of advertising, the advertising technology is
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simply characterized by a single parameter indicating the constant marginal
cost of reaching one more consumer. On the consumer side, there are two
types of agents: (a small fraction of) shoppers who are fully informed about
prices at no cost and other consumers who search with a standard sequential
search protocol with constant search cost. By studying the implications of
this set of assumptions, our analysis is complementary to that of the seminal
paper by Robert and Stahl (1993).
In this set-up, we reach some important somewhat controversial conclusions.
First, if the cost of one of these technologies becomes arbitrary small, the
model’s outcome gets very close to the fully competitive outcome where price
equals marginal cost. The fully competitive outcome occurs when consumers
are somehow fully informed of all prices. This will necessarily happen if one
of the technologies becomes arbitrarily cheap. Second, there are important
non-monotonicities in the relations between expected prices on one hand
and search and advertising cost on the other hand. This means that it
may very well be the case that when, for example, search cost decrease
expected price increases. An important part of the explanation for this
phenomenon to occur is that search and advertising are ’substitutes’ over an
important domain of the model’s parameters in the sense that if consumers
(initially) start searching more (because of a decrease in search cost) firms
will advertise less. In the aggregate this may mean that consumers actually
are less informed about prices when search cost are lower and this gives
firms an incentive to raise prices. Third, advertised prices may actually be
higher than non-advertised prices for some region of the parameter space
(for example when the advertising cost are not too low and the search cost
is relatively high). This happens, for example, when there is relatively little
search so that most consumers that consider buying from non-advertising
firms are shoppers. As these consumers are fully informed about prices, this
forces these firms to charge quite low prices. Advertising firms will focus
then on the non-shoppers and as they will not search further if they have
received an ad, these firms enjoy some monopoly power if there is not too
much advertising in the economy.
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Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 3.3
Suppose F0(p) has an atom at pˆ and consider a firm not advertising and
charging a price pˆ.15 We will show that this firm has an incentive to lower
its price slightly.
Suppose the competitor also does not advertise and charges price pˆ, what
happens with nonzero probability. Then the per-firm profits are
pˆ[
1
2
γ +
1
2
(1− γ)Ir0<θ + µ
1
2
(1− γ)Ir0=θ],
where Ir0<θ is 1 if r0 < θ and 0 otherwise.
If the firm decides to set price pˆ− ε it makes profit
(pˆ− ε)[γ + (1− γ)Ir0<θ(
1
2
Ipˆ≤r0 + Ipˆ>r0) + µ
1
2
(1− γ)Ir0=θ],
which is larger than the expression above provided ε is small. (Recall from
lemma 3.1 that pˆ > 0 so also pˆ− ε > 0 for ε small.)
Suppose the competitor chooses another strategy. Lowering the price charged
will never reduce the number of sales. The loss from lowering the price by
ε will therefore at most be ε.
Lowering the price by ε will with positive probability lead to a gain and
with the complementary probability lead to a loss of at most ε. Choosing ε
small enough will lead to a net gain. This shows firms have an incentive to
charge pˆ− ε instead of pˆ, which is a contradiction.
We will now prove the fact that F0(r0) = F1(r0) = 1. Suppose p0 ≥ p1
and p0 > r0 Then a firm not advertising and charging p0 does not sell any
item and makes profit 0. This contradicts the fact that expected profits are
strictly positive, as explained below lemma 3.2.
Suppose p0 ≤ p1 and p1 > r0. Then a firm advertising and charging p1 does
not sell any item and makes profit −A. This again contradicts the corollary
on strictly positive profits.
2
Proof of Lemma 3.4
We will here prove the part of the theorem about pi0(p). The proof for pi1(p)
follows the same lines and will be skipped. We first note that for all p in the
support of F0(p), pi0(p) = pi0 by definition of an equilibrium. Furthermore,
note that pi0(p) = p(αγ(1−F1(p))+ 12(1−α)(1− γ)µ+(1−α)γ(1−F0(p)))
and pi1(p) = p(α(1−F1(p))+(1−α)(1−γ)+(1−α)γ(1−F0(p)))−A. Since
there are no atoms in the price distributions (see lemma 3.3), both profit
functions are continuous. We also note that since p
0
and p0 are both in
the support of F0(p), pi0(p0) = pi0(p0) = pi0. We now proceed the argument
15The proof that F1(p) is atomless follows a similar argument and will be skipped.
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by contradiction. Suppose pi0(p) is not constant. Then there is at least
one price pˆ for which pi0(pˆ) 6= pi0. If pi0(pˆ) > pi0, setting price pˆ would be
better than setting price p
0
, contradicting the fact that p
0
is in the support
of F0(p). If pi0(pˆ) < pi0, pˆ is not in the support of F0(p) and due to the
continuity of pi0(p) it is possible to find p and p, with p < pˆ < p such that
pi0(p) = pi0(p) = pi0 and for every 0 < x < 1, pi0(p∗) = pi0(xp + (1 − x)p) <
pi0 = xpi0(p) + (1 − x)pi0(p). Using the above expression for pi0(p), and the
fact that for all 0 < x < 1 p∗ is not in the support of F0(p), this can be
rewritten as p∗(1−F1(p∗)) < xp(1−F1(p))+(1−x)p(1−F1(p)). Using this
we can show that pi1(p∗) < xpi1(p) + (1− x)pi1(p) and so no advertising firm
will ever charge p∗. However, since p∗ is also not in the support of F0(p),
both price distributions have a gap in the price region (p, p). This gives
pi0(p) < pi0(p), a contradiction.
2
Proof of Theorem 3.5
There are three possibilities for an equilibrium not to be of one of the types
mentioned in the theorem. We will show that all these three possibilities
cannot be part of an equilibrium.
0 < α < 1 and p0 > p1 Using standard techniques, we note that in this case
p0 = min{r0, 1} and that F0(p) = 1 − (p0−p)
1
2
µ(1−γ)
pγ for p ≥ p1.
Whenever p > p1, the profit for an advertising firm equals pi1(p) =
p[γ(1− α)(1− F0(p)) + (1− γ)(1− α)]− A. Using the expression for
F0(p) it can be shown that
pi1(p) = (1− α)12µ(1− γ)(p0 − p) + (1− γ)(1− α)p−A,
which is increasing in p for p1 ≤ p ≤ p0, showing that advertising firms
have an incentive to deviate.
0 < α < 1 and p
1
< p0 < p1 In this case, using lemma 3.4, pi0(p) = pi1(p)
in the price region [max{p
0
, p
1
}, p0], giving an expression for F1(p) as
follows:
F1(p) = 1−
A− (1− 12µ)p(1− α)(1− γ)
α(1− γ)p .
Moreover, using this and pi0(p0) = pi0(p) we get F0(p) = 1− (p0−p)(
1
2
µ−γ)
pγ
on [max{p
0
, p
1
}, p0]. To make sure F0(p) is below 1, 12µ− γ should be
positive. We furthermore can derive an expression for F1(p) for p ≥ p0
by using pi1(p) = pi1(p0), which can be written as
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p[(1−F1(p))+(1−γ)(1−α)]−A = p0[(1−F1(p0))+(1−γ)(1−α)]−A.
This gives for p ≥ p0,
1− F1(p) = αp0[(1− F1(p0)]− (1− α)(1− γ)(p− p0)
αp
Plugging this expression into pi0(p) for p ≥ p0 gives pi0(p) = γp1(1 −
α)(1−γ)+p(1−α)(1−γ)(12µ−γ), which is increasing in p since 12µ−γ
is positive. This shows the non-advertising firms have an incentive to
deviate.
0 < α < 1 and p0 < p1 In this case, pi0(p) = p(αγ + (1 − α)(1 − γ)12µ) for
p0 ≤ p ≤ p1, which is increasing in p and so non-advertising firms have
an incentive to deviate.
2
Remainder of the Proof of Proposition 3.7
Equilibrium type b assumes µ = 1. The other main difference with equi-
librium Ia is that now r0 < 1 instead of r0 = 1. The equilibrium can be
derived along the same lines as equilibrium Ia and gives the same expres-
sion for F0(p), except that now µ = 1. Using
∫ r0
p
0
F0(p)dp = c we derive that
r0 = c1+ 1−γ
2γ
ln 1−γ
1+γ
= cβ1 . Note that r0 < 1 gives restriction
c < β1.
Furthermore, for α = 0 to hold, it should not be profitable to deviate to
advertising. This, like in equilibrium Ia, gives restriction
(1− γ)r0 −A < 12(1− γ)r0 ⇔ c <
2Aβ1
1− γ .
2
Remainder of the Proof of Proposition 3.8
We first continue the derivation of the conditions under which equilibrium
IIa holds. We define g(x) = 1+1−γ2γ x ln
1
2
xA
1
2
xA+(1− 1
2
x)γ
−(1−12x) ln
A(1− 1
2
x)
(1−γ)(1− 1
2
x)− 1
2
Ax
.
We also define f(x) = 1 − γ−
1
2
x
γ ln
x−2γ
x . Note that g(µ) = c defines µ for
equilibrium IIai and that f(µ) = c defines µ for equilibrium IIaii. We
furthermore note that f(x) and g(x) are decreasing in x, the proof is avail-
able on request. We also define x1 = 1 + γ − A −
√
(1 + γ −A)2 − 4γ and
x2 = 1 + γ − A +
√
(1 + γ −A)2 − 4γ and note that g(x1) = f(x1) and
g(x2) = f(x2).
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Note that for restriction (11) to make sense, p
0
should be smaller than
p
1
. This restriction gives
1
2
µr0A
1
2
µA+(1− 1
2
µ)γr0
< A
(1−γ)(1− 1
2
µ(1−α)) , which can be
rewritten as 12µr0(1 − γ)(1 − 12µ(1 − α)) < 12µA + (1 − 12µ)γr0. Using ex-
pression (4), and r0 = 1, this can be rewritten as (1− 12µ)(2γ−µ)+Aµ > 0
or 12µ
2 − (1 + γ −A)µ+ 2γ > 0. This function is a quadratic function with
zero points at µ = 1+γ−A±√(1 + γ −A)2 − 4γ, or lies completely above
the x-axis if (1 + γ − A)2 − 4γ < 0. This means that p
0
< p
1
if and only if
(1+ γ −A)2− 4γ < 0 or µ < x1 or µ > x2. Note that (1+ γ −A)2− 4γ < 0
can be rewritten as A2−2A(1+γ)+(1−γ)2 < 0 or (1−γ)2
(1+
√
γ)2
< A < (1−γ)
2
(1−√γ)2 .
Now note that for the equilibrium to exist, 2− 2A(1−γ) should be larger than 2γ,
since 2γ < µ < 2− 2A(1−γ) . This gives A < (1−γ)2. Since (1−γ)
2
(1−√γ)2 > (1−γ)2,
whenever A > (1−γ)
2
(1+
√
γ)2
we are done with the restriction p
0
< p
1
and we
only have to deal with restriction (11). When A < (1−γ)
2
(1+
√
γ)2
, we have the
additional restriction that either µ < x1 or µ > x2. This can be translated
in c > g(x1) or c < g(x2) by using the definition of µ given by expression (9).
For restriction (12) to make sense, p
0
> p
1
should hold. This restriction
gives 12µ
2 − (1 + γ − A)µ+ 2γ < 0. This means that p
0
> p
1
if and only if
(1+γ−A)2−4γ > 0 and µ > x1 and µ < x2. Note that (1+γ−A)2−4γ > 0
can be rewritten as A < (1−γ)
2
(1+
√
γ)2
or A > (1−γ)
2
(1−√γ)2 . Again, 2 − 2A(1−γ) should
be larger than 2γ, and so A > (1−γ)
2
(1−√γ)2 is not possible. Therefore, equilib-
rium type IIaii exists when restriction (12) is met, and A < (1−γ)
2
(1+
√
γ)2
and
x1 < µ < x2. Note that x1 < µ < x2 can be rewritten as f(x2) < c < f(x1)
by using definition (10).
Combining the above results, and noting that restriction (11) can be rewrit-
ten as max{g(1), g(2− 2A1−γ )} < c < g(2γ) and restriction (12) can be rewrit-
ten as max{f(1), f(2− 2A1−γ )} < c < f(2γ) we get that equilibrium IIa exists
for A < (1−γ)
2
(1+
√
γ)2
whenever
max{g(x1), g(1), g(2− 2A1− γ )} < c < g(2γ)
or
max{f(1), f(2− 2A
1− γ ), f(x2)} < c < min{f(x1), f(2γ)}
or
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max{g(1), g(2− 2A
1− γ )} < c < min{g(x2), g(2γ)}
and exists for A > (1−γ)
2
(1+
√
γ)2
whenever restriction (11) holds.
Note that since g(x) is decreasing in x, max{g(1), g(2 − 2A1−γ ), g(x1)} =
g(min{1, 2− 2A1−γ , x1}) and using that f(x) is decreasing in x, max{f(x2), f(1), f(2−
2A
1−γ )} = f(min{x2, 1, 2− 2A1−γ }).
We now first assume A < 1−2γ2 <
(1−γ)2
(1+
√
γ)2
. Under this assumption, 2− 2A1−γ >
1, x1 < 1 (using that x1 is increasing in A) and x2 > 1 (using that x2 is
decreasing in A). This last inequality means that g(x2) < g(1) and so
max{g(1), g(2 − 2A1−γ )} < c < min{g(x2), g(2γ)} is not possible. Using that
x1 is increasing in A, it is easy to see that x1 > 2γ and so we can rewrite
the parameter restrictions above as g(x1) < c < g(2γ) or β2 = f(1) < c <
f(x1) = g(x1). This finally gives parameter restrictions β2 < c < g(2γ) =
1 + (1− γ) ln (1−γ)2−Aγ
A(1−γ)+(1−γ)2 for A <
1−2γ
2 .
Now assume 1−2γ2 < A <
(1−γ)2
(1+
√
γ)2
. In this case, x2 > 2γ and x1 < 2− 2A1−γ .
When γ < 14 , x1 < 1, x2 < 1 and x2 < 2 − 2A1−γ . So for γ < 14 , the
region where equilibrium IIa holds can be written as g(x1) < c < g(2γ)
or f(x2) < c < f(x1) or max{g(1), g(2 − 2A1−γ )} < c < g(x2), what can be
combined as max{g(1), g(2 − 2A1−γ )} < c < g(2γ). When γ > 14 , x2 > 1
and x1 > 1, and so max{f(x2), f(1), f(2 − 2A1−γ )} < c < min{f(x1), f(2γ)}
and max{g(1), g(2− 2A1−γ )} < c < min{g(x2), g(2γ)} are both empty regions.
Equilibrium IIa in this case exists for max{g(1), g(2 − 2A1−γ ), g(x1)} < c <
g(2γ), or, since x1 > 1, max{g(1), g(2− 2A1−γ )} < c < g(2γ). Therefore, when
1−2γ
2 < A <
(1−γ)2
(1+
√
γ)2
, equilibrium IIa exists when max{1 + 1−γ2γ ln AA+γ −
1
2 ln
A
1−γ−A , 1 +
1−γ−A
γ ln
1−γ−A
1−A } < c < 1 + (1− γ) ln (1−γ)
2−Aγ
A(1−γ)+(1−γ)2 .
As already mentioned before, when A > (1−γ)
2
(1+
√
γ)2
, equilibrium IIa holds
when max{1+ 1−γ2γ ln AA+γ − 12 ln A1−γ−A , 1+ 1−γ−Aγ ln 1−γ−A1−A } < c < 1+ (1−
γ) ln (1−γ)
2−Aγ
A(1−γ)+(1−γ)2 .
This shows that the parameter restrictions for equilibrium IIa are as in
Proposition 3.8.
We now proceed to the derivation of equilibrium IIb. This derivation follows
the same lines as the derivation of equilibrium IIa. Again, there are two
types of equilibrium: type i with p
0
< p
1
and type ii with p
0
> p
1
. We get
the same expressions for F0(p), F1(p) and α as for equilibrium IIa, except
that now µ = 1 and r0 < 1.
For case i,
∫ r0
p
0
F0(p)dp = c, implicitly defines r0 as r0(1 + 12 ln(
r0
A (1 − γ) −
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1)− 1−γ2γ ln( r0A γ + 1)) = c. Note that for A1−γ < r0 < 2A1−2γ this expression is
increasing in r016.
For equilibrium IIbi to exist, we need that 0 < α < 1, what translates to
r0 >
2A
1−γ . Furthermore, p0 < p1 gives restriction r0 <
2A
1−2γ . And finally,
r0 < 1. These three restrictions can be expressed in terms of c and A using
the implicit definition of r0. This gives
2Aβ1
1− γ < c <
2Aβ2
1− 2γ
for A < 1−2γ2 , and
2Aβ1
1− γ < c < 1 +
1
2
ln(
1− γ
A
− 1)− 1− γ
2γ
ln(
γ
A
+ 1)
for A > 1−2γ2 .
For case ii,
∫ r0
p
0
F0(p)dp = c gives r0 = c
1+
1
2−γ
γ
ln(1−2γ)
= cβ2 . The equilibrium
exists when r0 > 2A1−2γ (required because p0 > p1 is assumed), and again
2A
1−γ < r0 < 1. Note that r0 >
2A
1−γ holds as long as r0 >
2A
1−2γ holds. This
gives parameter restrictions
2Aβ2
1− 2γ < c ≤ β2.
2
Remainder of the Proof of Proposition 3.9
The derivation of equilibrium IIIb follows the same lines as the derivation
of equilibrium IIIa, the only difference is that µ = 0 and consequently r0 ≥
1. The equilibrium expressions for α, F0(p) and F1(p) are the same as the
expressions for equilibrium IIIa with µ = 0. The restrictions needed for this
equilibrium to hold are as follows. Note that µ = 0 requires
∫ 1
p
0
F0(p)dp < c
and this gives
16Since the assumption p
0
< p
1
requires r0 <
2A
1−2γ , we only need the behavior for
r0 <
2A
1−2γ . It is however interesting to look at the general behavior. It turns out that
g(r0) = r0(1 +
1
2
ln( r0
A
(1 − γ) − 1) − 1−γ
2γ
ln( r0
A
γ + 1)) is a parabola, such that for each c
small enough there are two solutions for g(r0) = c. The smallest solution is the solution
we look at and this one is stable. The other solution is unstable, and gives r0 >
2A
1−2γ . To
analyze the stability of a solution, suppose g(r0) < c. This tells that the expected gain
from searching when the already obtained price(s) equal r0 is lower than the search costs
and so consumers will also stop searching when they have obtained a price slightly higher
than r0. This induces firms to raise their price and so r0 increases. The case of g(r0) > c
is reverse and leads to a decrease in r0. The smallest solution is in a region where g(r0)
increases, and so is stable. The other solution is in a region where g(r0) decreases, and so
is unstable.
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c > 1 + ((1− γ)−A) ln (1− γ)
2 − (1− γ)A
(1− γ)2 + γA .
The other restriction that needs to hold is 0 < α < 1. However, note that
for the above restriction to hold, A should be smaller than 1 − γ, so α as
defined by α = (1−γ)
2−(1−γ)A
(1−γ)2+γA is between 0 and 1 whenever the above restric-
tion holds. 2
Proof of Theorem 4.1
a Observe that when c → 0, the equilibrium is given by equilibrium Ib.
This equilibrium has α = 0 and µ = 1. Furthermore, r0 = cβ1 → 0,
while the maximum price equals r0. 2
b Observe that when A → 0, either equilibrium IIaii or equilibrium IIbii
holds.
First look to equilibrium IIaii. In this equilibrium, µ does not depend
on A, α = 1 − A
(1−γ)(1− 1
2
µ)
→ 1 and Ep1 = A(
1
2
µ−γ
α(1−γ)(1− 1
2
µ)
ln µ−2γµ +
1
α(1− 1
2
µ)
ln 1−
1
2
µ
A )→ 0.
In equilibrium IIbii, α = 1 − 2A(1−γ)r0 , while r0 does not depend on
A. This leads us to α → 1. Furthermore, Ep1 = A 2α ln (1−2γ)r02A −
A
(1−γ)α ln(1− 2γ)→ 0. 2
c First note that when γ → 0, β1 → 0, β2 → 0 and 1+ 1−γ−Aγ ln 1−γ−A1−A → 0.
This implies that equilibria Ia, Ib and IIbii disappear. Also, equilib-
rium IIbi has restriction 2A1−γ < r0 <
2A
1−2γ , so equilibrium IIbi also
vanishes. This leaves us with equilibria IIa, IIIa and IIIb.
Let us first look at equilibrium IIai. We will rely heavily on the
derivation of Proposition 3.8, using the same notation. Whenever
A < 1−2γ2 , equilibrium IIai holds when g(x1) < c < g(2γ). Note that
g(x1) < c can be rewritten as µ < x1 and since x1 → 0 equilibrium
IIai requires µ → 0 when A < 1−2γ2 . When 1−2γ2 < A < (1−γ)
2
(1+
√
γ)2
,
equilibrium IIai holds when g(x1) < c < g(2γ) or max{g(1), g(2 −
2A
1−γ )} < c < g(x2).17 Since g(x2) → 0 for γ → 0 the last restriction
vanishes. This again leaves the restriction g(x1) < c or µ → 0. The
case where A > (1−γ)
2
(1+
√
γ)2
need not be considered since (1−γ)
2
(1+
√
γ)2
→ 1.
We now know that in equilibrium IIai µ→ 0. Using this it is easy to
see that α→ 1−A and F1(p)→ 1− A(1−p)p(1−A) .
17Note that we only look at the case where γ < 1
4
. We can leave the case where γ > 1
4
aside since we are only interested in the equilibrium behavior for γ small.
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Let us now look at equilibrium IIaii. Note that 1+
1
2
µ−γ
γ ln
µ−2γ
µ → 0
for γ → 0 and µ > 2γ. Since in equilibrium IIaii µ is defined by
1 +
1
2
µ−γ
γ ln
µ−2γ
µ = c we conclude that µ→ 2γ → 0. Plugging this in
the expression for α gives α → 1 − A and this finally gives F1(p) →
1− A(1−p)p(1−A) .
For equilibrium IIIa to hold, µ < 2γ and so µ → 0. Plugging µ → 0
and γ → 0 in equation (15) gives α → 1 − A. Plugging α → 1 − A
and γ → 0 in the expression for F1(p) gives F1(p) → 1 − A(1−p)p(1−A) . For
equilibrium IIIb, µ = 0, α→ 1−A and F1(p)→ 1− A(1−p)p(1−A) . 2
2
Derivation of the comparative statics results in the tables 1 to 3
The results in the tables are derived by first deriving the derivatives of
α, µ,Ep0, Ep1, pi and welfare with respect to c, A and γ, and then evaluat-
ing the sign of these derivatives. We first note that for every equilibrium α
and µ are already defined in the text. Furthermore, for all equilibria except
equilibrium IIIb with µ = 0, Ep0 = r0 − c. This is by definition since r0
is defined as
∫ r0
p
0
(r0 − p)dF0(p) = c or, since p0 ≤ r0, r0 − Ep0 = c. In
equilibrium IIIb, Ep0 =
∫ p0
p
0
pdF0(p). In all equilibria, Ep1 =
∫ p1
p
1
pdF1(p)
and pi and welfare are as defined in the text.
In some equilibria, several parameters like µ and α are only implicitly de-
fined. This complicates the derivation of the derivatives. Another compli-
cation is that many derivatives have a complicated expression, making it
difficult to evaluate the sign. We will now derive the comparative statics
results with respect to c, A and γ for equilibria Ia and IIb, thereby showing
several of the techniques we also use for the other equilibria. The derivation
of the results for the other equilibria is available on request.
In equilibrium Ia, α = 0, so the derivative of α w.r.t. c, A or γ is 0.
Define f(µ; γ) = (1−γ)µ2γ ln
(1−γ)µ
2γ+(1−γ)µ + 1. Note that f(µ; γ) = c implicitly
defines µ as function of γ and c. Therefore, ∂µ∂A = 0. Simple calculus
gives ∂f(µ;γ)∂µ =
(1−γ)
2γ ln
(1−γ)µ
2γ+(1−γ)µ +
(1−γ)
2γ+(1−γ)µ . Since the second derivative
of f(µ; γ) w.r.t. µ is positive, and ∂f(µ;γ)∂µ is negative at µ = 1,
∂f(µ;γ)
∂µ < 0.
We also calculate ∂f(µ;γ)γ =
−µ
2γ2
ln (1−γ)µ2γ+(1−γ)µ − µ2γ+(1−γ)µ > 0, where the
sign of the last expression is determined by noting that the derivative w.r.t.
µ is negative and that at µ = 1 the expression is positive. Using that
∂f(µ;γ)
∂c +
∂f(µ;γ)
∂µ
∂µ
∂c = 1,
∂f(µ;γ)
∂c = 0 and
∂f(µ;γ)
∂γ +
∂f(µ;γ)
∂µ
∂µ
∂γ = 0, we derive
that ∂µ∂c < 0 and
∂µ
∂γ > 0.
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In equilibrium Ia, Ep0 = 1 − c and so ∂Ep0∂A = ∂Ep0∂γ = 0 and ∂Ep0∂c = −1 <
0. We also note that since in equilibrium Ia α = 0, Ep1 is not defined.
Furthermore, pi = 12(1− γ)µ. This gives ∂pi∂A = 0 and ∂pi∂c = 12(1− γ)∂µ∂c < 0.
We also get ∂pi∂γ = −12µ + 12(1 − γ)∂µ∂γ . To evaluate this expression we use
∂µ
∂γ = −∂f(µ;γ)∂γ /∂f(µ;γ)∂µ ; this gives ∂pi∂γ = 12(1−γγ (1−γ)µ2γ ln (1−γ)µ2γ+(1−γ)µ)/∂f(µ;γ)∂µ >
0.
Welfare is defined as W ≡ 1− (1−γ)µc− (1−γ)(1−µ). Note that ∂W∂A = 0,
∂W
∂c = −(1−γ)µ+(1−γ)(1− c)∂µ∂c < 0 and ∂W∂γ = µc+(1−µ)+ (1−γ)(1−
c)∂µ∂γ > 0.
In equilibrium IIb, µ = 1 and so the derivative of µ w.r.t. the model
parameters is 0. Before deriving the other derivatives, we first take a
better look at r0, as r0 is contained in many expressions. In equilibrium
IIbi, r0 is implicitly defined by f(r0;A, γ) ≡ r0(1 + 12 ln( r0A (1 − γ) − 1) −
1−γ
2γ ln(
r0
A γ + 1)) = c. Using simple calculus, we derive that
∂f(r0;A,γ)
∂r0
=
f(r0;A,γ)
r0
+ r0(1−γ)2
2A+r0(2γ−1)
(r0(1−γ)−A)(r0γ+A) > 0 since
2A
1−γ < r0 <
2A
1−2γ . Also,
∂f(r0;A,γ)
∂A =
r20(1−γ)
2A
r0(1−2γ)−2A
(r0(1−γ)−A)(r0γ+A) < 0 since r0 <
2A
1−2γ . These re-
sults give ∂r0∂c > 0 and
∂r0
∂A > 0. The sign of
∂r0
∂γ depends on the sign of
∂f(r0;A,γ)
∂γ =
−r20
2(r0(1−γ)−A) −
r20(1−γ)
2γ(r0γ+A)
+ r0
2γ2
ln( r0A γ + 1). This expression can
be both positive and negative: when r0 = 2A1−γ ,
∂f(r0;A,γ)
∂γ = A(
−2
(1−γ)2 −
2
γ(1+γ) +
1
γ2(1−γ) ln
1+γ
1−γ ), which is decreasing in γ and 0 at γ ≈ 0.372.
In equilibrium IIbii, r0 = cβ2 and so
∂r0
∂c =
1
β2
> 0, ∂r0∂A = 0 and
∂r0
∂γ =
c
γβ22
( 12γ ln(1− 2γ) + 1) < 0.
We are now ready to look at the comparative statics results for the adver-
tising intensity α, which is given by 1 − 2Ar0(1−γ) . First, ∂α∂c = 2A1−γ 1r20
∂r0
∂c >
0. Furthermore, ∂α∂A =
2
r0(1−γ)(−1 + Ar0
∂r0
∂A ). In equilibrium IIbi,
∂r0
∂A =
−∂f(r0;A,γ)∂A /∂f(r0;A,γ)∂r0 and substituting this expression we get Ar0 ∂r0∂A − 1 =
−(r0γ+A)(r0(1−γ)−A)2f(r0;A,γ)
(r0γ+A)(r0(1−γ)−A)2f(r0;A,γ)+r20(1−γ)(2A−r0(1−2γ))
< 0, so ∂α∂A < 0. In equilib-
rium IIbii, ∂r0∂A = 0 and so
∂α
∂A < 0.
Finally, we look at ∂α∂γ =
2A
r0(1−γ)(− 11−γ+ 1r0
∂r0
∂γ ). In equilibrium IIbii,
∂r0
∂γ < 0
and so ∂α∂γ < 0. In equilibrium IIbi, we use
∂r0
∂γ = −∂f(r0;A,γ)∂γ /∂f(r0;A,γ)∂r0 . A
tedious derivation then shows that − 11−γ + 1r0 ∂r0∂γ < 0 and so ∂α∂γ < 0.
In equilibrium IIb, Ep0 = r0 − c and so ∂Ep0∂A = ∂r0∂A , which is positive
in equilibrium IIbi and 0 in equilibrium IIbii. Also, ∂Ep0∂γ =
∂r0
∂γ , which
can be both positive and negative in equilibrium IIbi and is negative in
equilibrium IIbii. Finally, ∂Ep0∂c =
∂r0
∂c − 1. For equilibrium IIbi, we use
that ∂f(r0,;A,γ)∂r0
∂r0
∂c = 1. Plugging in r0 =
2A
1−γ shows that
∂Ep0
∂c can be both
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positive and negative, since ∂Ep0∂c at r0 =
2A
1−γ is increasing in γ and 0 at
γ ≈ 0.4345. In equilibrium IIbii, ∂Ep0∂c = 1β2 − 1 > 0.
To calculate the derivatives of Ep1, we first need an expression for Ep1 =∫ p1
p
1
pdF1(p). In equilibrium IIbi, Ep1 = A(1−γ)α ln
1+α
1−α , while in equilibrium
IIbii Ep1 = 2Aα ln
1−2γ
(1−α)(1−γ)− A(1−γ)α ln(1−2γ). In both equilibria, ∂Ep1∂α > 0
(in equilibrium IIbi, this is easy to see, in equilibrium IIbii use that r0 >
2A
1−2γ ). This shows that
∂Ep1
∂c =
∂Ep1
∂α
∂α
∂c > 0. We now look at
∂Ep1
∂A . In equi-
librium IIbi, ∂Ep1∂A =
1
(1−γ)α ln
1+α
1−α+
∂Ep1
∂α
∂α
∂A =
1
(1−γ)α ln
1+α
1−α− 2r0(1−γ)
∂Ep1
∂α +
2A
(1−γ)r20
∂Ep1
∂α
∂r0
∂A > 0 since some calculus shows that
1
(1−γ)α ln
1+α
1−α− 2r0(1−γ)
∂Ep1
∂α >
0 and it is easy to see that 2A
(1−γ)r20
∂Ep1
∂α
∂r0
∂A > 0. In equilibrium IIbii, some
calculus shows that ∂Ep1∂A =
1
α2
(1−2γ1−γ ln(1 − 2γ) − 2 ln 2Ar0 − 2 + 4Ar0(1−γ)) > 0
since this expression is increasing in r0 and r0 > 2A1−2γ . The derivative of Ep1
w.r.t. γ gives a very complicated expression. We can however show that for
instance in equilibrium type IIbii for γ = 0.4 the derivative is negative for
A
c < 0.15096 and positive for
A
c > 0.15096. This is enough to prove that the
derivative can be both positive and negative.
Using the definition of α, it is easy to see that pi = A and so the results in
the tables follow.
Finally, we look at welfare. In this case, W = 1−2A+ 4A2r0(1−γ)(1− cr0 ). Note
that in equilibrium IIbii cr0 = β2. In equilibrium IIbi
∂W
∂c = − 4A
2
r20(1−γ)
+
4A2
1−γ
2c−r0
r30
∂r0
∂c , what can be shown to be negative. In equilibrium IIbii,
∂W
∂c =
− 4A21−γβ2(1− β2) 1c2 < 0.
In equilibrium IIbii, the derivative w.r.t. A, ∂W∂A = −2+ 8A(1−γ)r0 (1−β2). At
r0 = 2A1−2γ ,
∂W
∂A can be both positive and negative, indicating that in general
in equilibrium type IIb the derivative of welfare w.r.t. advertising costs A
can be both positive and negative.
The derivative of welfare w.r.t. γ in equilibrium IIbii is ∂W∂γ =
4A2
r0(1−γ)2 (1−
c
r0
)+ 4A
2
1−γ
2c−r0
r30
∂r0
∂γ =
4A2
r0(1−γ)(
1−β2
1−γ +
2β2−1
γβ2
( 12γ ln(1− 2γ)+1)). Note that the
first part of this expression, 4A
2
r0(1−γ) , is positive, while the second part is a
function of γ and can be both positive and negative. This shows that in
equilibrium IIb welfare can be both increasing and decreasing in γ.
Note that in the foregoing discussion we obtained exact results even in cases
where the derivative is a quite complicated function. This is because in all
cases that have been discussed it was possible to find some numerical values
that show that (in at least one of IIbi and IIbii) the derivative can be both
positive and negative. In equilibria IIa and IIIa we sometimes encounter
cases where we are unable to find such numerical values. We solve this by
plotting the derivatives, to find whether they possibly are altogether positive
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or altogether negative. A complication is that the derivatives are functions
of three variables, which cannot be plotted as a whole. We solve this by
fixing one of the variables, γ, and then plotting the derivatives as a function
of the two remaining variables. We fix γ to 0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15, etc., getting
a reasonable idea of the behavior of the derivative. The cases where we use
this method are marked with an ∗ in the tables.
We note that equilibrium Ib has the same structure as equilibrium IIb, and
can be analyzed in roughly the same way. Equilibria IIa and IIIa can be
analyzed in roughly the same way as equilibrium Ia. In equilibrium IIIb
there are no parameters that are implicitly defined, and so this equilibrium
is quite easy to analyze.
2
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